Al abordar el estudio de la obra de Primo Levi, encontramos, ligada al núcleo de referencias que tienen como fuente su experiencia como superviviente del Holocausto, una temática singular, concebida por el autor como ejemplo de respuesta de la razón humana frente a la barbarie. El trabajo creativo, el mundo de los oficios, recorre como profunda reivindicación moral toda la obra de Levi, siendo la línea de fuerza positiva más importante que puede hallarse en la misma. En el (...) presente artículo vamos a abordar críticamente este fecundo ámbito de referencialidad, analizando su concepción, sus vinculaciones y sus límites. (shrink)

Coletânea de artigos em homenagem a Guido Antonio de Almeida e Raul Ferreira Landim Filho.

Primo Levi has emerged as one of the most incisive and humanly candid intellects among those writers who experienced the Holocaust and survived to tell about it. His classically concise, sober and lean style is reflective of a mind that insists on being guided by reason and civility. To express himself in a rational, clear and composed manner signified for Levi a moral victory over the Shoá and gave and additional dimension of validity to his own survival. Leviʼs (...) insistence on the writer as witness and communicator, like the definition of the artist as builder of alternative worlds, retains some coherent vision of the social order and mandated relationship between history and art. In his finals years, his sense of despair and disillusion is also reflected by his increasing references to the black holes, and image he uses metaphorically to express the dark void of recent history and the charge of no-meaning and death in human life. (shrink)

The phenomenon of prophecy is a significant topic with a relevant uniqueness in medieval Jewish thought. In Jewish tradition, prophecy was a form of intermediation between the divine and human. Our intention in this paper is to explore and understand this problem like a theological idea and like an intellectual phenomenon of consciousness with obvious epistemological implications. We shall do taking into account the philosophical influences of this conception, fundamentally Islamic thinkers, and focusing our search in the most significant perspectives (...) about the topic, namely Yehudah Ha-Levi, Abraham ibn Daud and Moses Maimonides. (shrink)

Em seu exame da teoria da verdade cartesiana, Raul Landim (1993, 2009) enuncia as três questões que toda teoria da verdade deve responder: (a) o sentido de ‘verdade’; (b) a possibilidade de conhecimentos verdadeiros e (c) a possibilidade do reconhecimento de conhecimentos verdadeiros. Os argumentos a serem apresentados dizem respeito sobretudo à terceira questão, mas consideram a necessidade de ser assegurar uma resposta adequada à segunda questão. Para tanto, retomarei (I) brevemente alguns pontos de um artigo anterior sobre o tema (...) (2017) para, em seguida, dar prosseguimento ao estudo ali iniciado, que ainda deverá ser completado em um terceiro texto, sobre atenção, representação e intecionalidade. Com efeito, três contextos argumentativos são relevantes para o exame da noção de atenção: (i) o tratamento psicofísico da atenção; (ii) as condições para a busca da verdade, no qual a atenção designa, prima facie, uma modulação do pensar, que é relevante para o método; (iii) a explicação do caráter intencional do pensar humano, no qual a atenção é um aspecto do pensar concernente à seleção do conteúdo pensado no tempo presente (presença). Somente o segundo será considerado aqui. Após a retomada dos resultados anteriores, apresentarei indícios da relação entre a atenção e o conceito de intenção na história da filosofia que precede Descartes e, em seguida, farei uma breve análise das ocorrências do texto na obra cartesiana (II). Por fim, na seção (III), passarei à análise daquelas ocorrências ligadas ao método do filósofo, tanto no que se refere à sua intervenção na determinação do critério de reconhecimento da verdade (a regra geral da verdade, ou regra do claro e do distinto), quanto no esclarecimento da via analítica do método de demonstração geométrico. (shrink)

The Cartesian notion of idea is the focal point of this paper, which aims to determine whether this concept entails (a) the proposition that ideas are the immediate objects of perception, or (b) the proposition that ideas are the immediate perception of objects, or (c) both. Merely examining the Cartesian texts raises this question, as there are passages that seem to support all these positions. This discussion is not original, as it delves into one of the key questions that Cartesian (...) philosophy posed to the philosophical discourse on the problem of knowledge in the seventeenth century and beyond, an inquiry that continues to reverberate in contemporary commentaries and studies on these theories. The hypothesis that I propose to defend is as follows: once the foundational principle of clarity and distinctness is established, it is necessary to affirm that the subject perceives the objects represented in the ideas that serve as the basis for true judgments, without excluding the proposition that the subject also perceives the ideas themselves. In other words, it is essential to consider that the Cartesian concept of idea encompasses both the object immediately perceived and, in certain cases, the immediate perception of the object. (shrink)

Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a (...) linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists. (shrink)

This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of his predecessors. In short, (...) the book deserves to become a classic....There is a great deal of interest in the book besides these basic matters [forumlating rules of acceptance]. Some of the most interesting chapters are those that examine the implications of such rules. The discussions of probability, generalization, and various forms of inference are brilliant and enlightening. Indeed, the problems and methods elaborated by Professor Levi in his book serve as a new foundation for the study of inductive inference."--Keith Lehrer, Nous"Levi's book is an extremely interesting report on 'tentative and speculative first steps' toward a decision-theoretic approach to inductive inference....Professor Levi is to be congratulated on his ingenious development and application of this approach...."--Richard C. Jeffrey, The Journal of Philosophy. (shrink)

This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.

Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values (...) with our rational choices. The norms impose minimal constraints on deliberation and inquiry, but they also impose demands well beyond the capacities of deliberating agents. This major collection will be eagerly sought out by a wide range of philosophers in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science, as well as economists, decision theorists, and statisticians. (shrink)

Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favor of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms (...) of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals. He compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for "mild contractions." These are formally the same as the "severe withdrawals" considered by Pagnucco and Rott. The rationale, however, is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing and to accounts of conditionals. Mild Contraction will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be (...) optimal, only what Levi terms 'admissible'. This book explores the consequences of denying the assumption and develops a general approach to decision-making under unresolved conflict. Professor Levi discusses conflicts of value in several domains - those arising in moral dilemmas, the drawing of scientific inferences, decisions taken under uncertainty, and in social choice. In each of these he adapts his theoretical framework, showing how conflict may often be reduced though not always altogether eliminated. (shrink)

'At last one of the most famous generalizing works in anthropology by the field's most stimulating and controversial contemporary figure has been translated, beautifully, and with the enlightening preface of the second French edition.

This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of his predecessors. In short, (...) the book deserves to become a classic....There is a great deal of interest in the book besides these basic matters [forumlating rules of acceptance]. Some of the most interesting chapters are those that examine the implications of such rules. The discussions of probability, generalization, and various forms of inference are brilliant and enlightening. Indeed, the problems and methods elaborated by Professor Levi in his book serve as a new foundation for the study of inductive inference."--Keith Lehrer, Nous"Levi's book is an extremely interesting report on 'tentative and speculative first steps' toward a decision-theoretic approach to inductive inference....Professor Levi is to be congratulated on his ingenious development and application of this approach...."--Richard C. Jeffrey, The Journal of Philosophy. (shrink)

Book Description (Blurb): Cognitive Design for Artificial Minds explains the crucial role that human cognition research plays in the design and realization of artificial intelligence systems, illustrating the steps necessary for the design of artificial models of cognition. It bridges the gap between the theoretical, experimental and technological issues addressed in the context of AI of cognitive inspiration and computational cognitive science. -/- Beginning with an overview of the historical, methodological and technical issues in the field of Cognitively-Inspired Artificial Intelligence, (...) Lieto illustrates how the cognitive design approach has an important role to play in the development of intelligent AI technologies and plausible computational models of cognition. Introducing a unique perspective that draws upon Cybernetics and early AI principles, Lieto emphasizes the need for an equivalence between cognitive processes and implemented AI procedures, in order to realise biologically and cognitively inspired artificial minds. He also introduces the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a pragmatic method to rank the different degrees of biologically and cognitive accuracy of artificial systems in order project and predict their explanatory power with respect to the natural systems taken as source of inspiration. -/- Providing a comprehensive overview of cognitive design principles in constructing artificial minds, this text will be essential reading for students and researchers of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. (shrink)

This volume presents a series of essays which investigate the nature of intellectual inquiry: what its aims are and how it operates. The startingpoint is the work of the American pragmatists C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. Inquiry according to Peirce is a struggle to replace doubt by true belief. Dewey insisted that the transformation was from an indeterminate situation to a determinate or non-problematic one. So Isaac Levi's subject is changes in doxastic commitments, which may involve changes in attitudes (...) or changes in situations in which attitudes are entangled. The question of what justifies modification of doxastic commitments is a normative one, and so may not be understandable in purely naturalistic terms."--Dust jacket. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSome firms are initiating pro-stakeholder activities and policies that transcend conventional corporate social responsibility conceptions and seem inconsistent with their business interests or economic responsibilities. These initiatives, which are neither legally nor morally obligatory, are responding to calls for a more active role of business in society and for a broader interpretation of CSR. In fact, they benefit stakeholders in a superior and an innovative way and are difficult to reconcile with commonly used rationales in the extant CSR literature, such (...) as win-win opportunities, creating shared value, or corporate philanthropy. For better insight, we develop a qualified account of the concept of supererogation from ethical theory. This account, which examines voluntary responses to moral obligations from which a business is normally excused, is applied to identify the unique features of the initiatives that are not readily understood within conventional reasoning, which is generally focused on a business case. (shrink)

Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey.

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build arti cial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the (...) comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the fi nal part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges. (shrink)

Este artigo discute o conceito de herdabilidade, empregado pela genética do comportamento, genética molecular e a teoria da herdabilidade, sob a perspectiva do modelo reticulado de racionalidade científica, de Larry Laudan. Analisa os argumentos contrários à utilização do termo herdabilidade focando principalmente nos resultados de experimentos da genética do comportamento. Conclui que algumas críticas ao termo herdabilidade são válidas tais como o termo poder ser confuso para o público em geral, mas podem ser extremas como as que propõem sua extinção. (...) A análise desenvolvida leva à conclusão de que a herdabilidade, tanto pela genética do comportamento, quanto pela genética molecular, é útil para seus respectivos fins. Os autores consideram que ao invés de ser extinto, o termo pode ser utilizado considerando mais análises, resultados e conclusões, sendo, portanto, essa a escolha mais racional e progressiva. (shrink)

Este artigo visa investigar, através do modelo entropológico de inspiração lévi-straussiana elaborado pelo filósofo Marco Antonio Valentim na obra Extramundanidade e Sobrenatureza (filosofia quente-sociedade fria e filosofia fria-sociedade quente), os desafios lançados ao pensamento pela mitologia lovecraftiana. Interpretaremos para isso a obra H.P. Lovecraft: a disjunção no Ser, do filósofo argentino Fabián Ludueña Romandini, buscando posicionar a temporalidade no centro da análise entropológica. Contrastando a mitologia lovecraftiana com o pensamento das sociedades quentes, somos levados a sobrevoar as regiões da loucura, (...) do sonho e do trabalho, para finalmente alcançar um dos nódulos temporais da modernidade, expresso na imagem do tempo como intuição interna do sujeito transcendental da filosofia kantiana. Depois de uma breve comparação entre a filosofia lovecraftiana e a filosofia kantiana, seguimos em direção à filosofia aceleracionista de Nick Land, contrapondo o cosmos lovecraftiano ao cosmos tecnocrático do expoente contemporâneo das sociedades quentes e suas tendências entrópicas. Finalmente, retomamos a interpretação entropológica da mitologia lovecraftiana analisando as preocupações referentes ao horror vacui destacadas por Valentim na sua obra, apoiando-nos para isso no lugar outorgado às escolas filosóficas pelo filósofo argentino na sua obra sobre Lovecraft. (shrink)

In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, (...) some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an individual. (shrink)

In this work we argue that there is no strong demarcation between pure and applied mathematics. We show this first by stressing non-deductive components within pure mathematics, like axiomatization and theory-building in general. We also stress the “purer” components of applied mathematics, like the theory of the models that are concerned with practical purposes. We further show that some mathematical theories can be viewed through either a pure or applied lens. These different lenses are tied to different communities, which endorse (...) different evaluative standards for theories. We evaluate the distinction between pure and applied mathematics from a late Wittgensteinian perspective. We note that the classical exegesis of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, due to Maddy, leads to a clear-cut but misguided demarcation. We then turn our attention to a more niche interpretation of Wittgenstein by Dawson, which captures aspects of the aforementioned distinction more accurately. Building on this newer, maverick interpretation of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, and endorsing an extended notion of meaning as use which includes social, mundane uses, we elaborate a fuzzy, but more realistic, demarcation. This demarcation, relying on family resemblance, is based on how direct and intended technical applications are, the kind of evaluative standards featured, and the range of rhetorical purposes at stake. (shrink)

In this article we present an advanced version of Dual-PECCS, a cognitively-inspired knowledge representation and reasoning system aimed at extending the capabilities of artificial systems in conceptual categorization tasks. It combines different sorts of common-sense categorization (prototypical and exemplars-based categorization) with standard monotonic categorization procedures. These different types of inferential procedures are reconciled according to the tenets coming from the dual process theory of reasoning. On the other hand, from a representational perspective, the system relies on the hypothesis of conceptual (...) structures represented as heterogeneous proxytypes. Dual-PECCS has been experimentally assessed in a task of conceptual categorization where a target concept illustrated by a simple common-sense linguistic description had to be identified by resorting to a mix of categorization strategies, and its output has been compared to human responses. The obtained results suggest that our approach can be beneficial to improve the representational and reasoning conceptual capabilities of standard cognitive artificial systems, and –in addition– that it may be plausibly applied to different general computational models of cognition. The current version of the system, in fact, extends our previous work, in that Dual-PECCS is now integrated and tested into two cognitive architectures, ACT-R and CLARION, implementing different assumptions on the underlying invariant structures governing human cognition. Such integration allowed us to extend our previous evaluation. (shrink)

The article responds to some of the points raised by B. van Fraassen concerning probability kinematics and direct inference within the framework of the approach to the revision of probability judgment proposed by Levi in The Enterprise of Knowledge. In particular, the critical importance of the question of direct inference is emphasized and explained.

In the first part, a first exploration is made on the issue of sayability and unsayability using conceptual and investigative resources taken from the phenomenological descriptions made by Husserl in Ideas I. A first and still broad result is reached, namely, that any Erlebnis, taken in its fullness and plenitude, is ineffable, and therefore, life itself, because it is only a stream of lived experiences, as it is lived at each and every mo-ment, is unsayable, ineffable. The limit of linguistic (...) expression referred to in the title is, thus, its impossibility to express a full Erlebnis. Then, linguistic expression is examined against the background of the plenitude of this life that it cannot express but from which and in which it emerges, and this inspection brings to light in a preliminary way the several horizons that encircle it.En la primera parte, se hace una primera exploración del tema de la decibilidad y la indecibilidad empleando recursos metodológicos y conceptuales tomados de las descripciones fenomenológicas hechas por Husserl en Ideas I. Con ello se alcanza un primer resultado todavía muy amplio, a saber, que toda vivencia, tomada en su integridad y plenitud, es inefable, y por tanto, la vida misma, puesto que consiste en una corriente de vivencias, tal como es vivida en todos y cada uno de sus instantes, es precisamente inefable, indecible. El límite de la expresión lingüística a que el título se refiere es, pues, su imposibilidad para expresar una vivencia plena. Luego, se examina la expresión lingüística contra el fondo de la plenitud de la vida que no puede expresar pero de la cual y en la cual emerge, y esta inspección trae a luz de manera preliminar los diversos horizontes que la circundan. (shrink)

In the face of mounting criticism against advance directives, we describe how a novel, computer-based decision aid addresses some of these important concerns. This decision aid, Making Your Wishes Known: Planning Your Medical Future , translates an individual's values and goals into a meaningful advance directive that explicitly reflects their healthcare wishes and outlines a plan for how they wish to be treated. It does this by (1) educating users about advance care planning; (2) helping individuals identify, clarify, and prioritize (...) factors that influence their decision-making about future medical conditions; (3) explaining common end-of-life medical conditions and life-sustaining treatment; (4) helping users articulate a coherent set of wishes with regard to advance care planning—in the form of an advance directive readily interpretable by physicians; and (5) helping individuals both choose a spokesperson, and prepare to engage family, friends, and health care providers in discussions about advance care planning. (shrink)

According to an influential view, when it comes to representing reality, some words are better suited for the job than others. This is elitism. There is reason to believe that the set of the best, or elite, words should not be redundant or arbitrary. However, we are often forced to choose between these two theoretical vices, especially in cases involving theories that seem to be mere notational variants. This is the riddle of redundancy: both redundancy and arbitrariness are vicious, but (...) there are cases in which one must be picked. Logical realists admit that there are some logical constants among the elite words. This leads to awkward questions, such as which among conjunction and disjunction is elite. In this paper, I show how the riddle of redundancy arises for logical realists, and offer a solution. This approach requires us to change how we represent negation. Instead of using some particular symbol, we represent negation by flipping formulae over the horizontal axis. (shrink)

McCradden and colleagues' argues that machine learning in health care poses new challenges to appropriate evaluation for safe use in clinical care. It also claims that “the longstanding syst...

In this paper we propose a computational framework aimed at extending the problem solving capabilities of cognitive artificial agents through the introduction of a novel, goal-directed, dynamic knowledge generation mechanism obtained via a non monotonic reasoning procedure. In particular, the proposed framework relies on the assumption that certain classes of problems cannot be solved by simply learning or injecting new external knowledge in the declarative memory of a cognitive artificial agent but, on the other hand, require a mechanism for the (...) automatic and creative re-framing, or re-formulation, of the available knowledge. We show how such mechanism can be obtained trough a framework of dynamic knowledge generation that is able to tackle the problem of commonsense concept combination. In addition, we show how such a framework can be employed in the field of cognitive architectures in order to overcome situations like the impasse in SOAR by extending the possible options of its subgoaling procedures. (shrink)

Freud propôs uma teoria da personalidade a partir do estabelecimento da psicanálise. Nosso objetivo é percorrer alguns de seus primeiros textos, os quais foram escritos em conjunto com Breuer, buscando delimitar o que Freud compreendeu a respeito de alterações da personalidade, tal como a múltipla personalidade. Este fenômeno ganhou um importante destaque no século XIX, gerando discussões no campo da psicologia e da filosofia, uma vez que implicava ruptura da unidade da personalidade. Freud, por sua vez, ofereceu uma interpretação original (...) de tais alterações à luz de suas investigações sobre a histeria. Para explicar os desdobramentos da personalidade, Freud focou numa teoria da defesa, colocando o recalque (_Verdrängung_) como um mecanismo modelo para compreender a personalidade e suas patologias. (shrink)

El artículo trata sobre la negación estoica y su crítica a la fórmula aristotélica según los testimonios de Apuleyo, Alejandro de Afrodisias y Boecio. La crítica se divide en tres aspectos: (i) sistematicidad (ya que una misma regla no se aplica a todo tipo de proposición); (ii) universalidad (ya que todo par contradictorio no divide la verdad y la falsedad sin excepción alguna); y (iii) rigurosidad (ya que el sujeto de la proposición puede no existir o no ser lo que (...) creemos que es). Se concluye que el fondo de la crítica no se relaciona con que una fórmula es inconsistente o hace imposible la lógica y sus operaciones, sino que tiene relación con cuál fórmula es más ambigua y menos preferible. (shrink)

During the last decades, many cognitive architectures (CAs) have been realized adopting different assumptions about the organization and the representation of their knowledge level. Some of them (e.g. SOAR [35]) adopt a classical symbolic approach, some (e.g. LEABRA[ 48]) are based on a purely connectionist model, while others (e.g. CLARION [59]) adopt a hybrid approach combining connectionist and symbolic representational levels. Additionally, some attempts (e.g. biSOAR) trying to extend the representational capacities of CAs by integrating diagrammatical representations and reasoning are (...) also available [34]. In this paper we propose a reflection on the role that Conceptual Spaces, a framework developed by Peter G¨ardenfors [24] more than fifteen years ago, can play in the current development of the Knowledge Level in Cognitive Systems and Architectures. In particular, we claim that Conceptual Spaces offer a lingua franca that allows to unify and generalize many aspects of the symbolic, sub-symbolic and diagrammatic approaches (by overcoming some of their typical problems) and to integrate them on a common ground. In doing so we extend and detail some of the arguments explored by G¨ardenfors [23] for defending the need of a conceptual, intermediate, representation level between the symbolic and the sub-symbolic one. In particular we focus on the advantages offered by Conceptual Spaces (w.r.t. symbolic and sub-symbolic approaches) in dealing with the problem of compositionality of representations based on typicality traits. Additionally, we argue that Conceptual Spaces could offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of diagrammatic and analogical representations. As a consequence, their adoption could also favor the integration of diagrammatical representation and reasoning in CAs. (shrink)